Abstract: Power system robustness against overload condition is a challenging issue in the fields of power system planning and operation. In this paper, two indices are proposed to evaluate power system robustness. The proposed indices are used to identify critical lines whose failure is due to overload, leading the power system to cascading outages and blackout. The first proposed index is a linear index. The second index is based on graph theory metrics. To prevent cascading outages, system robustness is calculated for all N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies. The lines whose outages lead to the smallest robustness values are considered as critical lines. The proposed indices are validated by applying to the IEEE 118-bus test system. Simulation results demonstrate the capability of both indices in identifying critical lines. Therefore, the purposed indices could be used as a reliable metric to apply preventive actions against possible cascading outages and blackouts.
Wisconsin and University of Alaska to indicate the institutions collaborating to devise the simulation. In the case of overload, linear programming-based generation rescheduling and load shedding is applied. The branching process method proposes a probabilistic distribution function to determine the size of the blackout. This model gives the number of disconnected lines, as well as the amount of dropped load in each generation. However, it does not introduce any information about the mechanism of outages such as how, why, and which line is disconnected [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . TRELSS, a computer program for transmission reliability evaluation of large-scale systems, evaluates the probabilistic reliability of the system. This computer program captures a cascading path starting from an aggravated system condition and initiating event [20, 21] . The stochastic model simulates all events randomly. In the case of overload alleviation, linear programing is used for generation rescheduling [22] . The newly proposed interaction model tries to evaluate components' failures impacts on each other. This model is too complicated and also time-consuming since it needs results of the OPA model [23] . Recently there has been great effort to study cascading outages of power systems as a complex network, based on structural properties [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . In this method, the system is modeled as a graph with edges and nodes. The main objective of this model is to evaluate system robustness against cascading outages and blackouts, considering structural properties. The effect of load redistribution on system robustness was evaluated in [29, 30] . In this method, system load is assumed to be dependent on the node degree and number of nodes connected to the special node, while in the power system loads are independent of structure and are specified by users. The effect of node capacity on system robustness was studied in [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . These works present the cascading outage of nodes as the main cause of blackouts and node capacity enlargement as a preventive action. However, bus triggering is a rare event in power systems and has been studied scarcely. In the meantime, transmission expansion is only possible by constructing new transmission lines, which is not applicable in short-term studies. The effect of loading level on system robustness was presented in [37] . In order to prevent cascading outages, loads of nodes encountering overload are transmitted to neighboring nodes, while in a power system, lines play this role. On top of that, transmitting the loads between bus bars is impossible in a power system. The criteria proposed for robustness calculation are not only structure-based, but also independent of power flow equations. Despite the mentioned differences, one remarkable feature of this model is its ability to calculate system robustness. This ability helps find nodes whose outages trigger cascading outages and blackouts.
The main objective of this paper is to present two indices for evaluating system robustness. The system robustness for normal, N − 1 , and N − 2 contingencies is calculated using the indices. The lines whose outages decrease system robustness below the threshold value are considered as critical lines. The time domain analysis is performed in DigSILENT PowerFactory software and verifies the ability of the proposed indices in identifying the critical lines. Therefore, the purposed indices could be used as a reliable metric to apply preventive actions against possible cascading outages and blackouts. The proposed indices are applied to the IEEE 118-bus test system to demonstrate the performance of indices in large-scale systems. This test system has been used in many well-known publications in the field of power system operation and planning [38] [39] [40] [41] . The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed indices for robustness evaluation. Simulation results are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, a discussion on the proposed indices is presented. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 5.
Evaluation of robustness
The scope of this paper is focused on identifying crucial transmission lines whose failure exposes the remaining lines to overload. Identification of these lines is performed by calculating power system robustness in all N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies. Two indices are proposed for robustness calculation. The first index is a linear index. The second index is based on graph theory metrics. The proposed indices are evaluated as follows.
Robustness evaluation by linear index
The first index is calculated by a simple linear equation. The linear equation assigns a special weight to each line based on its loading level. Once the weights are calculated for each transmission line, the linear index is evaluated by summing all weights. Transmitted power on transmission lines changes due to topological changes such as line failure or generating unit outages. Regularly, power flow of the disconnected line is transmitted to its adjacent lines and increases their loading. In large-scale systems, while power flow increases in some transmission lines, it may decrease in some others. This issue results in misestimation of methods that use cumulative loading as a measure for overload estimation. Therefore, the proposed index should be able to recognize even fractional overload and should not be affected by power flow redistribution. Hence, the proposed linear index should introduce the following features:
1. The index should be able to recognize overload state in an L-line system when L − 1 lines are loaded at minimum, while the remaining one is at excessive level.
2. The index should be able to identify the normal state of the system while all lines are heavily loaded but there is no overloaded one.
These two features illustrate the importance of allocated weight to the lines. The designated weight is derived by Eq. (1), as depicted in Figure 1 . According to the figure, if the normalized difference between rated and actual apparent powers is smaller than the predefined security margin, the left axis line is used for weight designation. Otherwise, the right axis line is used.
Here, ω(l) is the assigned weight to line l ; a , a ′ and c, c ′ are slopes and intercepts of the linear equations, respectively. b is the predefined security margin. S rated (l) and S(l) stand for the rated and actual apparent powers of line l , respectively.
Once the weights are calculated, the linear index is evaluated by summing the weights according to Eq.
Here, l is the line number and L is the total number of lines in the system.
In this trend, if there is an overloaded line in the system, the linear index would be a large positive value;
otherwise, it would be a small negative value. The unknown parameters a, a ′ , c, and c ′ are selected such that they meet the mentioned features. Features 1 and 2 are mathematically expressed by Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively.
Here, 1 × a ′ (b − ε) + c ′ expresses the fractional overload of only one transmission line and the term
indicates that L − 1 lines are loaded at the minimum loading level.
Loading of the least loaded line is defined as the minimum loading level. Since there is one overloaded line in the system, the index should be a positive value. S min deals with the minimum loading level of line.
ε is the fractional overload of the line expressed by Eq. (5). Eq. (4) indicates that all lines are loaded at the maximum level and there is no overloaded line. Therefore, the index should be a negative value.
Here, k is a small value within the (0, 1) range.
Since even a fractional overload should be identified, a ′ should be much greater than a. Therefore, the relationship between a and a ′ is defined as below.
Here, K is a large positive value. By substituting Eqs. (5) and (6) in Eq. (3), it is rewritten as Eq. (7).
Here, K , k , a, and b are user-defined parameters.
Once user-defined parameters a and b are applied to Eq. (3), a proper range for c is obtained. Using the chosen value for c and applying it to Eq. (7), an interval to select an appropriate value for c ′ is achieved.
In this manner, the unknown parameters of Eq. (3) are calculated in accordance with the requirements of the mentioned features. As the system loading increases, the linear index increases, as well. Hence, the system's capability to prevent cascading failures decreases. This issue illustrates the inverse relationship between the linear index and system robustness.
Robustness evaluation by graph theory metric
In graph theory, systems are represented as a network by G(N, L) , where N represents the number of nodes (buses in power system) and L represents the number of branches (transmission lines and transformers in the power system). In a graph, interconnection of nodes is represented by an adjacency matrix, which is a symmetric N × N matrix. The adjacency matrix just represents the existence of connection between nodes and gives no information on the number of links between nodes or strength of links. The weighted adjacency matrix, W , assigns a special weight to each of the nonzero elements of the adjacency matrix. The allocated weight to each link, w ij , could be distance, cost, delay, or strength.
In order to study the graph robustness against cascading outage, a Laplacian matrix, Q , is utilized [42] .
The elements of the Laplacian matrix are computed using the weighted adjacency matrix and diagonal matrix,
∆ . The elements of the diagonal matrix are nonzero and computed by summing up the associated elements of each row of the weighted adjacency matrix as follows.
Here, δ ii are the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix.
The Laplacian matrix is computed by means of the weighted adjacency matrix and diagonal matrix as below.
Eventually, elements of Laplacian matrix are figured by Eq. (10).
The eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix give important information on system robustness against cascading outages. Since the sum of all elements in each row is zero, all of its eigenvalues are positive except the smallest one, which is zero. Effective graph resistance (EGR), one of the graph theory metrics for calculating system topological robustness, is derived by eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix according to Eq. (12) . The eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix and EGR are represented by Eqs. (11) and (12), respectively.
Here, R G and µ i are EGR and the eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix, respectively.
The EGR gives important information about the system's topological robustness against cascading outages. A small value of EGR represents the immunity of the system against cascading outage, while a large value denotes its vulnerability.
If the system response to an initial event leads to overload of other transmission lines, the overloaded lines are exposed to failure. As the number of disconnected lines is increased, integrity of the power system is jeopardized and the system faces cascading outages and blackouts. Since the power system obeys Kirchhoff laws, the robustness calculation needs to consider fundamental rules of the power system. However, EGR just considers topological features of the system and its application in robustness evaluation needs to apply electrical rules to the topological features. To achieve this goal, a weight proportional to the apparent power of the lines is assigned to them. As the lines' loading exceeds the rated power, it becomes weak and vulnerable. To illustrate its weakness, the allocated weight should decrease as its apparent power exceeds its rated power. In this work, the elements of the weighted adjacency matrix are defined as in Eq. (13) .
Here, w ij indicates the weight of line l , located between buses i and j .
According to Eq. (13), the allocated weight is the inverse of the designated weight by the linear index.
The only difference is associated with the existence of Z . As mentioned earlier, the elements of W should be positive values. However, the linear index assigns a large positive value to the lines whose normalized differences are smaller than the predefined security margin; otherwise, it gives a small negative value. In order to satisfy the requirement of W , the linear equation should be shifted above the x-axis. This goal is achieved by introducing Z into Eq. (13) . Once the parameters of the linear index are calculated, the value of the linear equation for
Since the difference between rated apparent power and actual power is greater than the predefined security margin, the linear equation would be negative. To shift the linear equation above the x-axis, the absolute of the evaluated value is selected as Z . Once the weighted adjacency matrix is calculated, diagonal and Laplacian matrices are derived using Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively.
In this trend, if the line is overloaded, its weight would be a small positive value close to zero, which indicates its vulnerability. Otherwise, it would be a positive value close to 1 that indicates its immunity against overload. In this manner, the EGR could be used as an index to study system robustness since electrical rules are applied to the topological features.
Simulation results
In order to apply the proposed robustness indices, the IEEE 118-bus test system is used as depicted in Figure   2 i.e. 99.99%, and there is no overloaded line. The EGR threshold calculation steps are shown in Figure 3a . As depicted in Figure 3a , after evaluating the EGR for outage of line i, it is compared with the threshold of the EGR. If the EGR is greater than the threshold value, the outage is considered as a critical outage; otherwise, it is categorized in the safe list. In order to identify the critical lines using the linear index, a similar procedure is applied considering zero as the threshold, which is shown in Figure 3b . Therefore, once N − 1 contingencies are simulated and related indices are evaluated, the contingencies are sorted based on the indices' values. Finally, the process ends with identification of critical lines. (13), (8) and (10) Eqs. (13), (8) and (10) Calculate E genvalues Calculate EGR by Eq.
Save the l ne number and EGR of the System n Cr t cal L st According to Figure 4 and Figure 5 , among all N − 1 contingencies, just failure of line 26-30, shown by black bar, exposes the system to overload. The linear and EGR indices for other failures, shown by gray bars, are the same as normal state values. In other words, these contingencies cause no danger to the system's security. Both linear and EGR indices give the same result in identifying the critical line. However, the linear and EGR indices specify different rankings for the rest of the failures. Since these failures do not threaten system security, the difference is negligible. 
Time domain analysis
In order to verify the ability of the proposed indices in identifying critical contingencies, the sequence of cascading failures following the worst N −2 contingencies is simulated in DigSILENT PowerFactory. The system frequency for the normal state and the worst N − 2 contingency is presented in Figure 8 . Once lines 26-30 and 23-25 are disconnected at t = 0.5s, the loading of line 25-27 increases to 242.5%. The impedance trajectory of the relay encroaches into the third zone of the distance relay and leads to outage of the line at t = 1.2s. Once the line is tripped off, generating units 25 and 26 connected to the rest of the system through lines 26-30 and 25-27 and generating 5% and 7.17% of total generation of the system, respectively, are disconnected. Following these outages the system is divided into 6 electrical islands. Since there is not sufficient generation within the islands to meet electricity demand, further generating units are tripped off, leading the islands to blackout. The drop of the frequency indicates vulnerability of the system to the sequence of mentioned contingencies.
Critical line identification
Among the critical contingencies, there are a few lines that play a critical role in cascading failures and blackouts.
Percentage of participation is defined as the ratio of failure numbers that each line participates in to the total failures that lead to cascading failures. The percentage of participation for lines participating in cascading failures is shown in Figure 9 . , and 9-10 are considered as critical lines as their failure increases the system loading level and lead the system to cascading outage and blackout since they have the greatest percentage of participation and system robustness dramatically decreases following single and cascading outages of these lines. The obtained results from DigSILENT PowerFactory reveal the accuracy of the proposed indices in identifying critical lines whose failures due to overload lead the power system to cascading outages and blackout. Apart from identifying the critical lines, the ability to distinguish among different contingencies is another advantage of the proposed indices.
Discussion
This paper presents two indices for power system robustness evaluation in order to identify critical lines whose outages lead the system to cascading outages and blackout. The most significant advantages of this work are summarized as follows: • The results of both indices in identifying the events that lead to cascading outage and blackout are in accordance with each other, according to more than 15,400 simulation results. In other words, although the linear index is much simpler than the mathematically based EGR index, it is capable of detecting the critical failures almost as accurately as the EGR index. Hence, the simple linear index is identified as an accurate and computationally efficient tool to recognize critical lines.
• The conventional methods presented for simulation of cascading outages are based on stochastic approaches that use complicated approaches for identifying the critical lines. However, the simplicity of the proposed indices is one of their advantages.
• The linear index is able to recognize even fractional overload in normal and overload states without being affected by power flow redistribution.
• By applying electrical rules to topological features, the EGR index, a well-known mathematically based index for evaluating system robustness based on topological features, is able to evaluate power system robustness.
• Both indices give the same result in ranking the most critical events. However, the remaining events have different rankings. The difference is ignorable since they have almost the same robustness value that indicates occurrence of overload in the system.
• The time domain analysis shows the accuracy of the indices in identifying critical lines.
• The percentage of participation reveals that some specific lines have the greatest impact on system robustness.
• Based on the accuracy and capability of the proposed indices in detection of critical lines, the indices could be applied to adopt preventive actions against possible cascading outages and blackouts.
Conclusion
In this paper two indices have been proposed for power system robustness evaluation in order to identify critical lines whose failures lead the power system to cascading outage and blackout. The first one is a linear index.
Parameters of this index are estimated based on two features. The first feature enables the index to identify even fractional overload. The second feature helps to distinguish between heavily loaded and overloaded states. The second index is based on graph theory, in which a special weight proportional to the line loading is assigned to the appropriate element of the related matrix. In this manner, the electrical information is applied to the topological features. The proposed indices are applied to the 118-bus test system using appropriate threshold values. The results for N − 1 contingencies indicate that only one contingency jeopardizes system robustness. However, numerous N − 2 contingencies decrease system robustness beneath the threshold. Analysis of the results illustrates that there are specific elements in the system whose cascading outage may lead to blackout although their single outage does not play such a role. On top of that, there are some specific lines that play critical roles in cascading outages and blackouts. The percentage of participation concept supports this claim. The results of both indices in identifying the worst N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies are the same. The percentage of participation reveals that only a small number of lines play critical roles in cascading outages and blackouts. According to the simulation results, the proposed indices could be used as effective tools for robustness evaluation and critical line identification in the power system. The drop of the frequency following the identified critical lines' outage also supports the ability of the purposed indices. Considering the ability of the indices in identifying critical lines, the indices could be used by operators to take preventive actions against possible cascading outages and blackouts. 
